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Since the introduction of licenses and quotas as important management instruments, Norway 
has established a system of non-transferable IVQs. The “cod-crisis” was a reason for the Nor-
wegian Parliament to reject an ITQ system with a high degree of transactions. However, since 
the late 80s the IVQ regime have forced towards a market-oriented regime for the expansion 
of the transferability.  
The overall aim of this work is to analyze the Norwegian IVQ and the New Zealand 
ITQ systems and discuss whether the effects of the IVQ system are in accordance with the 
original ITQ model or not. The thesis will focus on the following questions: 
1. What are the similarities and the differences between the New Zealand ITQ regime 
and the Norwegian IVQ system? 
2. How can the different systems be compared regarding results (biology, economy, and 
social aspects)? 
3. Is the Norwegian IVQ system just a stage before a fully implemented ITQ system or is 
it a system in its own right? 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
 
New Zealand and Norway. Two completely different countries. They are located on opposite 
sides of the planet, have widely different history, culture, traditions, nature, mentalities. But 
there is one thing that makes these countries close to each other and famous all over the 
world. It is successful fisheries management.   
For many coastal societies, the fisheries have always been important and guarantied 
their survival by giving employment and economic value. Now, with an advance in marine 
technologies, we fish longer, deeper, and harder than earlier. The catastrophe of many marine 
fisheries have been criticized for ineffective management of the common resource. Over the 
last three decades, countries from all over the world have been looking for management pro-
grams to limit their use of fishing resource.   
We differentiate two systems among the fishing industry that helps to understand the 
whole ideology and complexity of its structure. On the one hand, in the fisheries finds its 
place open access (OA). The terminology came from “The tragedy of the Commons”. OA 
presents “the race for fish” (Gordon, 1954) scheme, when fishermen try to catch as much fish 
as possible, as quickly as possible (if they would not do it, their competitor will). In OA, fish-
ermen have goal to maximize the yield every year, suppose that problems will fall to their fu-
ture generations. In prospect, open access brings to lower harvest, economic overinvestment 
by fishermen, and shortcut fishing seasons, as a result the perspectives of biological and eco-
nomic catastrophe. On the other hand, the most famous and successful system in the fisheries 
management - Individual Transferable Quota (ITQ). ITQs give fishermen a long-term prop-
erty rights, usually in a percentage of the total allowable catch (TAC), that reduces competi-
tion between fishers.  
ITQs can solve many problems in the industry, can stop “the race for fish”, improve 
economic and biological parameters of the fishery. ITQs encourage fishermen to fish safely 
and slowly, reduce the possibility for over-capitalization, and bring to the market a high-qual-
ity product. Though ITQs are not always perfective in their results and solutions, they do have 
problems. First of all, bycatch can rise through high grading and non-target species bycatch, 
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because time for fishing is increased, also it can lead to environmental destruction (like, the 
effect of trawling). Second, additional costs connected with the continued fishing seasons and 
implementation of ITQs. Third, competition between small scale fishermen and industrial 
fishermen. It is high probability that industrial fishermen will win quotas at open auction and 
the small scale fishermen will lose. Also, ITQ cannot always interpret to an increased stock 
biomass. This applies mostly to highly migratory species or extremely overfished stocks at the 
start of the introduction of the system.  
  
Can limitations be a reason not to use the ITQ systems? Definitely not. Problems can 
be solved with different strategies and methods combined with an ITQ-based system. Cur-
rently, over 30 countries are operating under ITQ management frameworks.  New Zealand 
was one of the first countries to accept ITQs as the best decision of managing its fishing in-
dustry. While not the pioneer, New Zealand was involved in the system of ITQs more com-
pletely than other countries. New Zealand became a great example to follow in the fishing in-
dustry for many countries. New Zealand did not have an old tradition of fishery before the 
ITQ. The system is adapted by the particular parameters of New Zealand and its fisheries. The 
good statistics, the lack of overfishing, stock status, management plans to protect marine 
mammals and seabirds, the development of full risk assessments and a lot of other positive 
outcomes make this system one of the most successful quota systems in the fishing industry.  
On the other side of the world, the Norwegian Quota System, cannot be characterized as an 
ordinary ITQ regime. Norway is famous for the great success in the fishing industry, this 
country is excellent example of a proper management in fishery. Norway decided to reject 
classical ITQ system in favor of a less flexible individual vessel quota (IVQ) system. How-
ever, in addition to its own structure of fishing industry Norway still has some explicit charac-
teristics of ITQ system.   
 
The unique combination of culture, nature and management gives New Zealand’s and 
Norwegian seafood leading positions in terms of sustainability and quality. There have been 
many books and papers published about the management system in New Zealand and Nor-
way. But the question about the unique of the quota system in Norway is still open. I found 
interesting to compare the systems of the fisheries management in New Zealand and Norway 
and discuss important aspects between the concepts of the IVQ regime and ITQ regime like 
an alternative management system.   
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1.1 Background  
 
 Before the growth of Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) during the 1970s, many countries 
had maritime territories up to 12 nautical miles. After the introduction of EEZs many nations 
started to develop their own national fishing on a maritime territory up to 200 nautical miles.  
New Zealand and Norway were not exceptions and established the 200 nautical miles 
EEZ in 1978 and 1977. New Zealand became one of the largest EEZ in the world. In fact Nor-
way established three zones of 200 nautical miles: an EEZ around the Norwegian mainland, a 
fishery zone around Jan Mayen (established in 1980) and a fishery protection zone around 
Svalbard (established in 1977).  
 
 
Figure 1. The Norwegian EEZ and the New Zealand’s EEZ (Sources: http://www.unesco-ioc-
marinesp.be/, http://www.mfe.govt.nz/) 
 
New Zealand is a world leader in the use of ITQ to manage fisheries. Eco-systems of the New 
Zealand have been never overfished (almost 83% of fish stock in New Zealand are at a 
healthy status) and are effectively managed for ecological sustainability. About 90% of sea-
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bed in New Zealand is undamaged by trawlers. In April 2007, the Government closed 17 ar-
eas in the New Zealand’s EEZ to bottom trawling. The area is equal to around 30% of the 
EEZ.  New Zealand produced around 440,000 tons of sustainable seafood annually.  In sea-
food export, New Zealand earns NZ$ 1.57 bill each year or 5% of total export value.  
The fishing industry is still new and does not have strong historical roots. The New 
Zealand’s Quota Management System (QMS) is characterized as a miracle. Hannesson (2013) 
used the right expression: “Given the availability of such a marvelous system as the ITQs, 
why have not all fishing nations implemented it?” According to him the New Zealand system 
contains the solution to the most of management problems.  
The Norwegian Quota System is rather different from the New Zealand’s QMS. Nor-
way manages one of the most productive marine environments in the world. In terms of value, 
Norway is the world’s second exporter of fish and fish products, making up 8% (around NOK 
74,5 billion in 2015) of the total export of Norway, the biggest share is represented by gas and 
oil (about 40% of the total value of Norway’s export in 2015, Norwegian Petroleum Direc-
torate, 2016). The main capture species are cod, herring, mackerel, capelin, saithe, haddock, 
and blue whiting. The additional species with high commercial value are Greenland halibut, 
prawns and ling.   
The sheltered and long coastline of Norway, with a lot of islands and fjords, and warm 
Atlantic Ocean current, has afforded great opportunities for fish farming. The aquaculture in 
Norway has developed into a main industry in coastal regions from the early 1970s. The Nor-
wegian aquaculture sector provides a high priority for fish health, environmental considera-
tions and welfare. The Atlantic salmon is the most valuable species in farming (about 90% of 
the total Norwegian aquaculture production). On the second place of the most produced spe-
cies in Norwegian aquaculture is Rainbow trout. Then follows several shellfish species (oys-
ters and blue mussels) while marine finfish (halibut, cod) are in the process of growing into 
commercial volumes. Of total export value in 2015 of US$ 5,450 million, input of the Atlantic 
salmon reached 3,400 million $ (Directorate of Fisheries, Statistics 2015).  
The main market for the export of Norwegian fish production is the European Union 
(EU), however salmon products are exported all over the world. Farmed salmon gives stabil-
ity to the Norwegian economy and it is still potential for this species for future growth. The 
major task for the industry is to develop a sustainable and effective aquaculture industry 
grounded in other species apart from salmon.  
The Norwegian seafood industry has progressed from free fishing to an organized in-
dustry with licenses and quotas. It has decided to reject ITQ system in favor of a less flexible 
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individual vessel quota system. ‘During the 1990s fisheries authorities actively denied that the 
IVQ system introduced in the coastal fleet had anything to do with ITQs’ (Hersoug, 2005: p 
119). IVQ has insisted to avoid market-based transaction of quotas and vessels, and to secure 
diversity regarding the fleet structure and decentralized ownership.  
  
1.2 Research questions  
  
The thesis present two different management systems based on the following research ques-
tions:  
1. What are the similarities and the differences between the New Zealand ITQ regime 
and the Norwegian IVQ system?  
2. How can the different systems be compared, regarding results (biology, economy, 
and social aspects)?  
3. Is the Norwegian IVQ system just a stage before a fully implemented ITQ system 
or is it a system in its own right?  
  
1.3 Methodology and structure of thesis  
 
 The research method for this thesis is qualitative analysis, that is generally based on second-
ary date, mainly the document analysis. Information was obtained from scientific papers, re-
ports and books, newspaper articles, and official reports from the national fisheries authorities 
in New Zealand and Norway (such as Statistics New Zealand, Ministry of Primary Industries, 
Norwegian Ministry of Fisheries and Coastal Affairs, and others).  
To answer the research questions, I used the following thesis structure. The basic 
background is introduced in Chapter 1. Chapter 2 includes the theoretical part of the work, 
and gives us a brief introduction in the Individual Quota System in the whole world, history, 
main ideas, and criticism. Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 present the New Zealand and the Norwe-
gian experience of individual transferable quotas. The main focus will be on the explanation 
about the core of the systems, the description of social and economic aspects, analysis of reg-
ulations in the offshore and inshore fishing, and the future of the systems. In Chapter 5 the re-
search will compare two quota systems by answering to the research questions. In the discus-
sion part I will analyze and broaden up the differences and the similarities between the Nor-
wegian and the New Zealand quota systems, and the role of self-governance organizations in 
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the systems. Chapter 6 is the concluding chapter that summarizes the work and presents the 




Chapter 2. Theory and methodology 
 
2.1 Individual Transferable Quota 
 
Initially, fisheries management creates a balance between conflicting economic, biological 
and social objectives. To find a fisheries system with an ideal rate of all components: stable 
economic rents, compensated harvested stocks, and equality of participants (and former par-
ticipants), is impossible. Generally, there are stories about losses: the elimination of coastal 
ecosystem by reason of long-time overfishing, damage of bottom ecosystems because of 
trawling, reduction in large predatory fish, reckless discarding, and these are just few exam-
ples. The easiest way to solve the hidden problem is based on an open-access fishery, which 
has no limitations on fishing effort and no barrier to entry. The serious problem of the com-
mon property nature of fishery resources were mentioned by Hardin (1968) in his famous arti-
cle: “Tragedy of the commons”.   
Lack of property rights has inspired fishermen to compete with each other for the fish. 
This competition usually brings to industry overexploitation and overcapitalization of fishery 
resources. Catches are limited and restricted nowadays in many ways, including closed areas 
and seasons, a cap on the TAC, limited entry, limited mesh and boat size, and gear restriction. 
These rules have been created to reduce catches so that the stock will recover at a level of so-
cially acceptable optimum yield. But maintaining a biologically optimal level of a fishery 
would degrade economic performance by restrictive regulations and extreme effort.  
Introduction of the ITQs in an industry supposed to advance economically rational 
fisheries exploitation (Dewees, 1998). ITQs are one of the most important institutional inno-
vation of the 20th century. The exclusive fisheries or economic zones are the common re-
sources of the ocean within 200 nautical miles of land; ITQs mean the opportunity of further 
privatization, to the level of individuals or firms. The goal of ITQs is to decrease excess fish-
ing effort and fishery overcapitalization. ITQs symbolize a structure of “right-based manage-
ment”, whereby governments participate in the fishery by controlling shares (size of the 
quota, quantity of gear or other inputs which fishers can use or harvest). The main key to suc-
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cess in ITQs management is transferability. Markets can operate and take over from manage-
ment agencies the best part of the role of allocating narrow resources (because of transferabil-
ity and exclusive rights) (Grafton, 1996).  The whole idea of ITQs is developed from the the-
ory that a multitude of competing users would be much worse than an individual proprietor to 
make an efficient solution on behalf of economic and natural resources.  The entry in the fish-
ing industry should be controlled in some way and the open access is a barrier to efficient and 
successful fisheries management (McCay, 1995).   ITQs involve the allocation of a share of 
TAC to the fishermen. The structure of ITQ systems depends on the fishery, political realities, 
economic goals, and industry history and organization. The main elements of ITQ manage-
ment include aggregation limits, initial quota allocation methods, resource rentals or cost rent-
als, adjusting and setting TAC, and degree of transferability (Dewees, 1998).   
The main limitations of ITQs are about the initial allocation of quotas, the socio-eco-
nomic outcomes for members, and the concentration of quota. The initial quota allocation 
parts are usually based on boats characteristics and historical landings. This may be a reason 
for fishermen to falsify their catch history in order to gain more quota. The concentration of 
quota to fewer members as overcapitalization is decreased, can lead to a social inequality 
among fishermen, between native and local fishermen, seasoned and new fishermen, crew and 
captain, and between generations, which lead to weak socio-economic outcomes for the fish-
ermen (Chu, 2009).  
ITQs provide fishermen with a long-term interest in the resource and can raise the net 
return from fishery and change fisher behavior. ITQs support the fishermen to minimize their 
expenses because their gross revenue is more or less permanent (under the condition that fish-
ermen harvest only their own quota). Also, this can decrease overcapitalization (Grafton, 
1996). ITQ systems give fishermen, producers or/and boats dedicated access rights to land a 
fixed quantity of TAC. It is a sector of a management, whereby the TAC is reserved by a reg-
ulatory agency and further on is shared on units that can be sold, leased or bought among 
members in the fishery. Most ITQs are fee-based with payments as for scientific research, 
funding enforcement and management (Chu, 2009).    
With the help of the ITQ, fisheries management may reduce the necessity for specific 
input control and other regulations. Cancellation of the limited fishing season can be a good 
example with no need of an input control (regulating days at sea, fleet capacity, etc.) because 
such controls pointedly cause inefficiency in the economic. Full year of harvesting may ena-
ble fishermen to land a higher-quality product and rise safety at sea. The transferability of the 
harvesting rights can provide fishermen with a more profitable yield and greater share of the 
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TAC. Such transfers may change the structure of the fishing industry because of the fact that 
the less profitable fishermen would leave the industry through the leasing or selling of their 
quota.   
The additional interest in the resource for fisheries is one of the striking trait of ITQs. 
The cost of the quota owned by individuals may promote more involvement in management 
by fishermen. Cooperation among fishermen and owners of the resource should both reduce 
the costs of control and improve the management of the industry (Branch, 2009).  
Realization of ITQ systems in marine fisheries has developed since 1986. The pro-
grams differ with respect to their size of the industry, number of members, conditions for 
transferability and various other characteristics. The first countries to introduce the ITQ re-
gime were Netherlands, Canada and Iceland in the late 1970s. The first country to adopt the 
ITQ as a national policy was New Zealand in 1986.   
  
2.2 Definition of ITQs property rights  
  
According to Barzel (1997) there are two basic disciplines in the property rights – law and 
economics. Economic rights are what people look for, and law fulfils supporting role, what 
can help to achieve economic rights. From a legal view, property right is a social convention 
supported by social institutions as the courts and legislative regulations. Property is a package 
of interests or rights in an asset to operate and use it. These property rights have a long history 
in traditional law as for land (as leasehold, freehold estate, usufruct, etc.), however, there is a 
little traditional law development in point of fisheries in the western institution in relation to 
rules introduced both by the Romans and thereafter in the Magna Carta that established an 
open access (OA). Property rights can be acknowledged and supported locally without gov-
ernmental consent, only to be admitted in the courts.  
On the part of an economist’s view, the property rights are about protecting economic 
interests. Many economists do not accept that property rights can be used to protect “non-eco-
nomic’ values, rights are used to dispose their value-added use to groups or individuals, ex-
cluding others. The economic view of property rights is more correct, because it does not con-
sider problems admitted at law (Connor, 2000).  
The economic view of property rights studies the influences of the dimensions of 
property rights on outcomes and economic motivation. Based on descriptions by Scott (1988, 
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2000) and Harte and Bess (2000) the dimensions consist of transferability, exclusivity, dura-
tion, security (or quality of title), divisibility and flexibility (Figure 2).   
 
 
Figure 2. Characteristics of efficient property rights (Sources: Scott (1988), Harte and Bass 
(2000)) 
 
x Duration means all quotas have a time span of more than 1 season. Some seem to be 
perpetual (“ownership” presents the property right in life annuity or till owner wants), 
and all can be revived.  
x Security, or quality of title refers to the ability of the owner to resist challenges from 
other individuals, institutes or the government and protect his right. Measure of 1 sup-
poses that the holder will keep his right with perfect safety, and otherwise (when a 
security measures of 0) it means the holder will necessarily lose his right.  
x Transferability explains the ability of the owner to transfer the property right to others. 
This characteristic helps the optimal resources allocation. An essential component of 
transferability is divisibility, the faculty to divide the property right into several parts 
for the goal of transfer. Exclusivity refers the chance for the owner to manage and use 
the resource without external interferences. An ITQ owner has a right to a definite 
volume of yield from a given stock over a concrete period of time. An ITQ right gives 
less than 100% exclusivity to the fish stock and its marine environment, because of the 
interference from others with this ability or other fishermen that can raise difficulties 














x Divisibility explains the possibility of property rights to divide more narrowly (by ge-
ographic, season, stocks, age, ground etc.), to move some quota to others, and to split 
the amount of quota into smaller amounts.  
x Flexibility gives the holders ability to “freely” system operations to gain their objects. 
This characteristic allows holders to change their production function or use their quo-
tas in most productive way (Gallic, 2004).  
 
Security and Duration characteristics gave the holders in the ITQ one of the power of owner-
ship – management. For short-time management, it provides the power of selecting where and 
when to land fish, and for which market. For long-time management, the composition and 
size of earlier yields belong to quota owner. There is a high correlation between what a quota-
holder captures today, and what he will take from the stock in future years. For this reason, 
each quota-owner has a limited ownership power over management which is divided between 
the owners according to the quota shares.   
Initially, in New Zealand and Iceland, the quota license was not transferable and per-
manent. But after a few years, the fishermen achieved these rights, and permanence gave 
them the chance to act more like “a farmer”. The quota-holder can obtain equipment and 
boats to landing for smaller numbers over long term, without any cut-throat competition. The 
owners can build markets for fish landed of an exact quality and at a certain time. If the fish-
erman has other opportunities, it gives him the right to rent or sell his quota permanently or 
for a definite period (Scott, 2000)   
Property rights send to a bundle of entitlements determining the owner’s rights, limita-
tions and benefits for use of the resource. Property rights have an influence on owners, they 
know that their actions will affect their current and future benefit and by inference they will 
use resources more effectively. In the fishing industry, because fish is a renewable resource, 
the property rights provide improvement for both utilization and conservation outcomes. In 
addition, this regulation would prevent destruction of the resource. The possibility of long-
term planning will give more sustainable use. Fishermen will invest their profit in the natural 
capital stock without the risk of having the profit stolen by others. Industry with a property 
rights has a better market development and research, investment in management system, sci-
entific research, more sustainable gear and lower harvesting rates in the short time (in the 
long time, the harvesting rates will increase with the expansion of the stock) (Stokes, 2000).  
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2.3 The initial allocation of rights  
  
Almost always ITQs are presented for free of charge to boat owners, because they bore the 
risk of investing in the fishing industry and should be compensated. Whereas other members 
were granted to vessel owners for their work. Regularly, allocations consist from vessels 
characteristics, catch history and similar shares. For example, in Alaska the allocation estab-
lished on catch history, the vessels owners could choose the best five out of sex years of 
catches for sablefish and five out of seven for halibut. When in the Tasmanian rock lobster 
fishery, the allocation mostly founded on an equal per-pot share and less on a catch history 
(Hartley and Fina, 2001).  
Many of the scientific works consider that the auction is the most economically effi-
cient process of distributing the TAC. The auction helps to share a profitable resource be-
tween many groups of people involved in the industry (not just to a particular group) (Clark 
and Munro, 2002). Auctions are not popular among the members of the fishing industry, but 
can be attractive to the public. The auction has the benefit that it brings new entrants to the 
industry. If the efficient are dynamic, they will decrease their costs. As a consequence of the 
low-cost, the more efficient fishermen will have the advantage on the others to pay a bigger 
price for the license. The income from the auctions (the resource rents) may be used by the 
government for different goals, either for general public purposes, or in particular related to 
the fishing industry.  
The allocation of quotas based on past landing and capital investments was used dur-
ing the initial allocation of ITQ in New Zealand (in 1985) The holders of a license were pro-
vided a share following the results of the best two of their past three years’ registered land-
ings (Clark, 1993). This allocation did not solve the problem of overcapacity, where the TAC 
was reduced for management goals. The New Zealand government realized a two-step buy-
back scheme, with a view to handle overcapacity. At the beginning, there was held a tender 
procedure where individual fisherman suggested their prices for leaving the industry to the 
government. It allowed the government to fix a price for the ITQs and reduced the capacity. 
The next step, was an offer from the governing body to buy further quotas, based on the first-
step prices. It was enough to reduce the total ITQs to the desired TAC’s level.   
One of the lack of the allocation based on historic catch, is an implication of the fish stock. 
The fishermen may decide to raise their landings (because of the increased effort) to get a 
bigger share of the TAC. Also, the allocation of quotas based on past landing can exclude 
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some new entrants. The cost of buying the quota may persuade potential fishers from enter-
ing, that would imply a non-efficient allocation of resources. But, according to the theory of 
competitive markets, if quotas are transferable, mutual exchange will push the less efficient 
operators out in favor of more efficient ones.  
In some countries, there exists the mix of two allocation methods, which simplify the 
entrance for the new members. For example, in Estonia 90% of the TAC is allocated in pro-
portion to past landing, other 10% is auctioned. Allocating ITQs to broader groups of interest 
means that fishing communities and crew members should be included in the division of in-
come. The good example is the Bering Sea and Aleutian Island (BSAI) crab fisheries, where 
ITQs are allocated to harvesters, and  
Individual Processing Quotas (IPQs) are allocated to processors (“two-pie” system, in 
January 20051). Harvesters must grant 90% of their yield to IPQ owners, the remaining por-
tion can be passed to any processors. If a local processor votes to interrupt operations, the 
fishing communities are given priorities to get IPQs. Like an added incentive, the 3 % of the 
TAC can be granted by those who are actively fishing.  
In Norway, the allocation method of the Norwegian cod fishery invites to invest in en-
vironmental friendly technology. The trawlers of the cod fishery utilize more CO2 per kg fish 
caught than the coastal fleet (6 times more). The allocation method here rewards environmen-
tally friendly fishermen with more quotas (Røed, 2013).   
  
2.4 A critical assessment of ITQs  
 
The criticism of ITQ is addressed to the ethical implications and the framework of ITQ mod-
els. For example, the problem in multi-species fisheries – the level of effort which is the best 
for one species may not be the best for another species. Furthermore, ITQ would be an unac-
ceptable management tool where there are many challenges that belong to determination of 
the optimal level of the TAC at the start of the season. This is related to unstable stocks or 
flash fisheries, when the fish must be caught in a certain time interval and in a particular con-
dition, like when roe is a priority and not the fish itself.   
                                                     
1 The “one-pie” and “two-pie” systems have been proposed to undercut the influence of ITQs on processors. Un-
der the “one-pie” system, part of the ITQs are automatically designated to the processors. In the “two-pie” sys-
tem, processors are allocated IPQs based on processing history, and harvesters are designated quotas as before 
(Matulich and Sever, 1999). 
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One of the major issues is a breach of the law, or quota busting. The most spectacular 
example is an experiment in the Bay of Fundy herring fishery with individual boat quotas that 
shows failure the system. The fishermen have lost motivation to stay bondable, when they 
knew that colleagues were cheating on their quotas without being caught. The industry needs 
monitoring to detect any breach and penalize.   
Influence of the fish size on a price per kg motivates the agents to fill the quota with 
only high quality fish, and exclude the low quality fish. Illegal discarding is not usually docu-
mented, and leads to overfishing, wrong information and decrease the net revenue derivable 
from the industry. The high grading and quota busting points at the priority of enforcement 
and monitoring in the ITQ regimes (Copes, 1986).  
The ITQ systems make changes in the social structure of the community, such as the 
structure of the fleet, working relationships on a boat, balance of power between buyers and 
harvesters, changes in function and structure of the management system, in fishing-dependent 
society, in policy and science. For example, if the owner of a boat and the quota-owner is a 
one person, it would affect the working relationship, with a distancing of the holder from the 
crew in the future. Many coastal communities depend on the owner-operator fishing. The in-
troduction of ITQs has made splits in the small coastal communities, between families that 
were involved with the initial allocation and others. These splits can be dangerous in many 
respects, it can influence the politics of school boards, churches and city hall. Also, the 
coastal communities are affected by the position of processing factory, and geographic shifts 
in fish landings (McCay, 2000).  
The quota system is affected by the concentration of wealth. The earnings from selling 
quotas belong to the quota-holder. Profitable rights to fish block entrance in the industry, and 
just the first generation gets the privileges for free benefit (Copes, 1986). New Zealand is an 
exception, with average 90 new entrants per year. The big concentration of rights in the Ice-
landic fishing industry was one of the destructive fallout from the financial crisis in 2007-
2008. The ITQs were used for speculation and mortgage-secured. In 2007, the substandard 
mortgage market went broke, the TAC dropped and the ITQs has played its role in the crisis 
(Røed, 2013).  
The meaning of a “common property” is vanished after the introduction of ITQs sys-
tem which is the regime of property rights. According to Røed (2013), the future of a marine 
resources in Norway is uncertain. The ministry of fisheries, when Helga Pedersen was the 
minister (2005-2009), decided that the fish belonged to the Norwegian people and property 
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rights could not be endless. But the case ended up in the Supreme Court due to the trawl own-
ers which were not satisfied with the ministry’s decision. The state won. In other industries, 
the members have to pay taxes or an extra charge for the handling of common property re-
sources, but people in Norway got no compensation for the resource they no more had access 
to.  
A technological development necessitated to limit an entrance to the fishing industry, 
for the purpose of the acquisition of income. Some quota-holders got property rights for free, 
they encroached the common resource. Access limitation would create user’s value, decrease 
a number of members and vessels. Other members were forced to change work and invest the 
capital in other industry (Hannesson, 2002). Now, many of the members in the industry be-
have like they are or should be the only owners of the common property.  
  
2.5 Research methodology   
  
This thesis is theoretical research found on secondary databases. There have been many books 
and articles provided to get an inside of the development of the ITQs system. The information 
was received through books, articles, reports, official documents and statistics. Most of the 
information was found in the Internet with use of web search engines scholar.google.com, 
Oria and Wiley online libraries, and professional network ResearchGate.  In this thesis there 
was collected information from such fields as governance, Food and Agriculture Organization 
of the United Nations, Eurofish, market, indigenous people in Norway and New Zealand, No-
fima, The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), legal frame-
work in Norway and New Zealand, the Treaty of Waitangi.  
The thesis is inspired by works of Hersoug: “Closing the Commons. Norwegian fish-
eries from open access to private property” (2005) and “Unfinished business. New Zealand’s 
experience with rights-based fisheries management” (2003).   
Theoretical framework is mostly based on Scott (1988, 2000), Grafton (1996), Annala (1996),  
Connor (2001). Theoretical part of the thesis found on “The Tragedy of Commons” by Hardin  
(1968) and “The Economic Theory of a Common-Property Resource: The Fishery” by Gor-
don (1954).   
During the selection of data and operating with the web search engines there were 
used the following keywords: Individual Transferable Quota, New Zealand, Individual Vessel 
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Quota, Norway, property rights, Māori, Saami, offshore and inshore fishing. The method of 
selection data for the Norwegian and New Zealand’s systems is performed with use of key 
characteristics, such as the historical background, the enforcement system, co-management 
organization, indigenous people, and economic efficiency.   
The method I used was to collect relevant secondary statistics on the Internet. I sys-
tematized the different statistical data for the current sectors aimed to help comparisons 
across two different systems and countries. I show statistics on development on national level 
(in Norway and New Zealand) over the last 1-2 decades, finished the most “nearby” year with 
complete data (2014 or 2015). For analysis of the management systems I used the standard 
categories in the statistics.  
Statistics on stock biomass, seafood export, quantity of catch, total growth in the fish-
ing industries can be found in Statistics Norway (under the topic “Agriculture, forestry, hunt-
ing and fishing”, sections “Aquaculture”, and “Fishing and catches”), and in Statistics New 
Zealand, also in data-bases of the Directorate of Fisheries (Norway), Ministry for Primary In-
dustries (New Zealand), the OECD, New Zealand Ministry of Fisheries (dissolved in 2012). 
The number of fishermen in the Norwegian fishing industry are available from 1945 until to-
day, and the total stock biomass of herring (Norwegian spring spawning) in Norway from 
1950. Economic dates were found in the organizations that are responsible for official statis-
tics in Norway and New Zealand (Statistics Norway, Statistics New Zealand). The thesis is 
based on only recent figures to show the actual situation.   
The structure of this work is partly inspired by the three master students’ theses: Ama-
kali (2011), Islam (2008), and Hotvedt (2010).   
There are few limitations connected to data collection for this thesis. Firstly, the geo-
graphical and financial frames were among the main restrictions in this work. Secondly, the 
core of the thesis is a comparison study of two management systems which are geograph-
ically located at opposite ends of the planet. Thirdly, there was no opportunity to travel all the 
way to New Zealand for data collection. In addition, I highlight out the human factor as the 
key limitation of this work. And last, but not least, the research would be much more in-












The fishing industry in New Zealand does not have a long tradition. The seeds of the future 
ITQ regime can be found in theoretical models developed by economists Pearce and Moloney 
in 1979 (Dewees, 2006). The QMS is formed by the specific characteristics of New Zealand 
fisheries. The country does not have shared resources with neighboring countries, so the gov-
ernment can make decisions regarding fisheries management without a lot of external influ-
ence (Aranda and Christense, 2009).   
Since the 1970s, New Zealand’s fisheries have changed greatly. For less than 10 years, 
New Zealand had a pure ITQ regime (from 1986 to 1999), but after 1999 the ITQ system was 
corrected to stimulate commercial stakeholder organizations take upon specific management 
responsibilities. With those changes, the system after 1999 is well-known as a co-manage-
ment regime based on ITQs, instead of a classic ITQ system (Yandle and Dewees, 2008).   
 
3.2 History of the system and context 
 
Before the ITQ system was introduced, fisheries in New Zealand were small and limited to an 
inshore domestic industry. From 1938, management in the fishing industry was disorganized, 
the industry was under tight controls with a bounding license system and deregulated almost 
until 1980. By 1980, after the introduction of the EEZ in 1978, it was understood that along 
with biological objectives, the economic ones were an important component for a productive 
management system. The quota-based deep-water trawl policy was announced in 1983. The 
TAC were introduced under this system, and quotas became the main element in the system 
(Clark, 1993).   
Before, New Zealand had a low yielding fishery and overexploitation moved the in-
shore fishery into a crisis. Licensed foreign fleets mostly controlled the offshore fishery 
within the EEZ (generally the fleets were from Japan, the Soviet Union, and Korea). Foreign 
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vessels were responsible for approximately 90% of the total demersal catch of 475,600 tons 
before implementing the EEZ (Sharp, 1997).   
The establishment of the EEZ made New Zealand a seafaring country, responsible for 
a marine area twenty times the size of New Zealand’s territory. The area was not very produc-
tive (around 75% of the area is deeper than 1000 meters), but it stimulated development of the 
national offshore fishery, partly based on new deep-water species (such as orange roughy).  
During the expansion, New Zealand had neither special skills, nor the fleet capacity 
needed for the offshore fishing. Just a few of the larger companies could productively move 
their capacity offshore from the inshore fisheries. The inshore zone continued to be highly 
over-capitalized because of the great majority of the new vessels were too small to be used in 
the deep-water fisheries.  
In the early 1980s, the New Zealand’s government presented many changes since eco-
nomic crisis called for drastic measures. The government offered three options for the weak 
industry: traditional business with a steady decline due to economic attrition; the TAC system 
with “Olympic fisheries” (restricted number of the days at sea); and an alternative implication 
ITQ, where the TAC in all main fishery was to be cut in individual parts based on past catch 
history (Hersoug, 2002).   
The ITQ-system was created to reduce pressure on the industry when a crisis took 
place in the inshore fishery. The “status quo” was not an option for the inshore fishery and the 
extent of overcapitalization and overfishing was documented. The ITQ system was the least 
disruptive to the current members, the best option of a bad lot. A pro argument for the ITQ 
system for the inshore fishery was based on the collapse in the present methods that depended 
on boat and gear controls. The ITQ were not presented like something radically new from the 
current management methods, and “the greatest promise of efficiency and stability” was made 
by the government and companies.  
Most fishermen didn’t understand what the new system was like, how much it would 
change the industry and how it would affect them personally. The New Zealand Federation of 
Commercial Fishermen (NZFCF) supported introduction of the ITQ for the inshore fishery, 
and they could see that it was the only one right way to protect the stocks and allow restruc-
turing of the industry, without damaging the existing fishermen (Sinner and Fenemor, 2005).  
The ITQ was introduced into New Zealand’s inshore and offshore fisheries on 1 Octo-
ber 1986. The seeds of the New Zealand’s ITQ model can be found in a theoretical model de-
 19 
veloped by Canadian economists Pearce and Moloney in 1979 (Dewees, 2006). The initial al-
location for those choosing to stay in the fisheries was based on average harvesting perfor-
mance taken in any two out of three fishing years (1982-1984).  
According to Luxton (1997), the core objectives of the QMS were to:  
1. Increase the recreational fishery,  
2. Reconstruct inshore fisheries,  
3. Limit catches to level that could be stable over the long time,  
4. Make sure that catches bring maximum benefit to country and to the industry,  
5. Integrate management of offshore and inshore fisheries,  
6. Create a management system suitable on both regional- and national-bases,  
7. Give permits for catch based on individual permit (Harte and Bess, 2000).  
 
The key element of the ITQ is transferring of property right to harvest a limited quantity of 
fish, including the right to lease. ITQs were prescribed in perpetuity. In the beginning, there 
were 25 species (or species groupings) in the QMS. The fishery for every single group is clas-
sified into the fish stocks (a number of different fishery management units). The QMS con-
sists from 10 different quota management areas (QMAs) and each Fishstocks belongs to one 
or more QMAs (Annala, 1996).  The QMS represents shares of Total Allowable Commercial 
Catches (TACCs), which mostly compensate the TACs and also include accounts of custom-
ary and recreational fisheries, and other fishing mortality (Mace, 2014).   
State Court of New Zealand asked the Minister to fix a TAC that moves a stock in the 
direction of its Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY). In offshore fisheries is no recreational 
interest to admit (like in the orange roughy fisheries), and the TACC is aligned to the TAC. 
On the other hand, the Minister is obligated to create allowances for non-commercial catches 
(TANC) in shared fisheries, like rock lobster. Non-commercial fishermen are controlled by 
daily catch limits, and commercial harvesters share of the TACC. In order to reach sustainable 
TAC levels, the government suggested to buy back the amount of quota.  
The measure of punishment inside the industry was strong and backstopped the pro-
cess (for example, the fine for quota busting was rough, with immediate confiscation of the 
vessel and all gears). In due course, other troubles were solved. For instance, to improve mon-
itoring of fishing activities in fishing areas, New Zealand launched the Vessels Monitoring 
System (the first satellite fishing tracking system in the world) in 1994.   
The data on changes in New Zealand fishing industry from 1986 to 2015 are presented 
in Table 1. Many factors have put pressure on the huge changes in the system. One of them is 
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a long-time general direction to “New Zealandization” of the fishery with more processing 
and harvesting inside the country. There are 130 commercial species in New Zealand, and the 
QMS control 100 species in 638 stock regions (Seafood New Zealand, 2015). Seafood exports 
have doubled after the introduction of the ITQ.   
 
Table 1. Changes in New Zealand fishing industry from 1986 to 2015 
Characteristics  1986-1987  2015  
Fishing industry employment (no. individuals)  7 900  20 000  
Quota owners nationally (no.)  1 356  1 500  
Fishing vessels (no.)  2 331  1 400  
Seafood exports (in $ NZ)  657 000 000  1 513 000 000  
Species groups under QMS (no.)  25  I7  
Sources: Annala (1996), Dewees (1998), FAO (2014), and New Zealand Ministry of Fisheries 
 
Bess and Harte (2000) mentioned that during the first ten years of the ITQ in New Zealand 
the positive results in the industry included a rise of the profitability, improved biodiversity 
because of progress in recovery strategies and high level of investment. At start there were 
many difficulties: limited knowledge about stock distribution and abundance; lack of the cri-
teria on how to share rights among stakeholders; as well as regulating and looking for activi-
ties like black marketing and quota busting.  
 
3.3 The Core of the system 
 
The enforcement system in New Zealand is based on a complex reporting process to prevent 
overfishing (the quota-holders must not catch more fish than they are empowered to catch), 
penalties for inflictors, and “reverse onus” bill2. At the beginning, the hard work on formal 
documentation and reporting procedures helped to develop systems to test, analyze and clas-
sify the information (Macgillivray, 1990).  
The present active fisheries regulation in New Zealand (including the high-sea regula-
tion) is the Fisheries Act 1996. The main goal of the law is the sustainable utilization of fish-
                                                     
2 Reverse onus obligates a violator to prove his guiltlessness rather that usage of the crown confirming guilt. 
 21 
eries resources. The Act announces that a person can hold only one fishing permit. The fish-
ing license identifies the stocks to which it belongs and it has to be subject to different condi-
tions, such as conditions about quantities, methods, regions, types and numbers of fishing 
gear, and the specific boat that can be used.   
In New Zealand, the judicial system and an effective MCS structure are the foundation 
of the QMS. The infrastructure of the Ministry of Fisheries includes patrols, a vessel tracking 
system supported by a qualified crew and satellite, together with military forces.  Considera-
ble crimes in New Zealand fishing industry include misreporting, faking of records, illegal 
fishing and sea dumping, declaration of harvests from other regions (different from place 
were vessels are admitted to fish). The Act brings detailed penalties and sanctions for abusing 
the law, including confiscation of boats and gear, cancelation of quotas and licenses, penal 
damages and the minimum acceptable requirement is the prison confinement. The MSC sys-
tem manages the documentation and pursuance of the technical measures (size limits, mesh 
size, area limitation), but technical measures are not a big question in the management of New 
Zealand fisheries (Aranda and Christensen, 2009).  
  
3.4 Indigenous people (Māori fishing rights)  
  
From ancient times, the fishery resource took up a great space for the Māori society, it was 
more than just a food source. A special complex of rituals made the connection between 
Māori and ocean “products” more specific. The deep respect for the ocean and its “products” 
underlines of the concern for fisheries. According to Firth (1959), the Māori had a clearly de-
fined property rights system in respect of fishing grounds and land. Each family owned their 
own fishing area with clear boundaries and the territory was handed down across the genera-
tions.  
The fishing was split by season, with climatic and geographic differences. The Māori 
were excellent fishermen, they knew where and when to fish (Sandrey, 1986).  On 6th Febru-
ary 1840, the Māori signed the Treaty of Waitangi3, which became the main reason for the 
New Zealand’s government to try to find a harmony between traditional Māori rights and the 
current capitalistic management system.  The agreement stipulates the protection of both a 
                                                     
3 The Treaty of Waitangi (or Tiriti o Waitangi) is a treaty between many the English Crown and the many of the 
Māori Chiefs of New Zealand. The Treaty recognized the moral and legal claim for Māori property of the land, 
forest and fishing resources in the New Zealand (Sandrey, 1986). 
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right to fish and the place of fishing. The Tribunal declared that the English Crown must take 
all the needed steps to support Māori in their fishing, and give them an active protection in the 
use of their waters and lands. “The full, exclusive and undisturbed possession of their fisher-
ies for as long as they wished to keep them” (Waitangi Tribunal 1988: 220). The Tribunal 
confirmed the Māori right to specify their own internal economic, social and political rights, 
and to maintain their own customary law and institutions. The Treaty acknowledged the 
Māori’s rights to their cultural and natural resources (including fishing resources) (Hersoug, 
2002).  
In 1957, the United Nations ratified Convention No. 107 which took under its protec-
tion indigenous and tribal populations in independent countries. Since then, indigenous peo-
ples have started getting back resources and rights lost during and after colonization and they 
have raised the political influence of their countries.  
At the beginning of the QMS inception, the social aspects were not taken into consid-
eration. The proper management and reorganization of the fleet were the main questions for 
the QMS. In 1983, part time fishermen (many of them were Māori) were not authorized for 
the initial distribution of quotas. For that period, the quota had been issued for 29 species 
(over the 80% of the commercial fisheries) (Aranda and Christensen, 2009).  
Now, the Māori controls more than 50% of the quota rights, while they make up about 
15% of the population. The Māori fishing industry controls about 28% of ITQ, on the condi-
tion that a 50% economic interest in the quota is under control of Sealord (half of this com-
pany owned by the Māori people). The asset value of the commercial fish resource under 
QMS in New Zealand in 2009 was $4,0 billion, and around $ 1,12 billion (28%) was owned 
by the Māori people (Statistics New Zealand, 2010).  
  
3.5 Self-governance organization   
  
There is a lot of literature and research papers about operation of the self-governance in New 
Zealand. Hersoug (2002) conducted research of New Zealand fisheries co-management and 
gives a good mark of the QMS in terms of developing commercial utilization, but the system 
runs into difficulties with a multi-stakeholder situation.  
The initiation of the ITQ in New Zealand was included as a compound of a market-
oriented reform of economic institutions. The reforms should make fisheries management 
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more effective by using private provision of services. The Ministry of Fisheries lost the re-
search functions in favor of a Crown research institute in 1992 (the National Institute for Wa-
ter and Atmosphere Research Limited).   
Commercial Fisheries Service (or “FishServe”) is the only private management 
agency in the world, that was given unique administrative functions by the government. Since 
2001, FishServe has operated to the comfort of both industry and government. FishServe, like 
an industry-owned service department, began to give total records management services for 
annual catch entitlement transactions (ACE), constant quota-share transactions, licensing, 
catches against ACE, and constructive value fee for catches that go beyond ACE. The ACE 
regime reduces barriers and gives the fishermen the possibility of obtaining a within-season 
right to catch a fixed number of fish, without the obligation to hold the quota. The ACE re-
gime has increased participation of the industry (Stewart and Callagher, 2011).  
FishServe pay to the budget of the government any payments related to government 
under these dealings. The relationship between FishServe and the Ministry of Fisheries is 
based on a combination of contracted assignation of some services and devolved assignation 
of others. The transfer of the administration functions from the Ministry took about 5 years 
and required big investments from the industry and government.  
The Challenger Scallop Enhancement Company (or “Challanger”) is a one of the well-
developed self-governance organization in New Zealand fisheries, it was introduced in 1994. 
The main destination of Challenger is a long time sustainability of the scallop fishery. This 
organization carries out research and stock assessments, fixes an annual quota corrected to a 
nominal maximum quota provided by the government, observes seafood safety and bio-tox-
ins, seeds juvenile scallops, and closes freshly seeded regions to guarantee growth. Challenger 
has made arrangements with dredge boats and recreational harvesters to administer monitor-
ing of use. This management behavior finances by the self-imposed expenses on catches 
(from 17% to 20%).  
At the beginning, there were a number of others self-management groups, but calling 
them co-management groups would be more correct. For example, the Bluff Oyster Manage-
ment Company was an autonomic organization addressing conditions of the stocks, which 
were susceptible to disease. To prevent overexploitation of sub-stocks, the Orange Roughy 
Company started a self-driving program to distribute fishing to sub-regions in quota control 
regions. The main goal of the company was to improve research and cooperation with the 
New Zealand government for maximizing the profit of New Zealand’s EEZ. The Crayfish 
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Management Advisory Committees are the basis of the New-Zealand rock lobster co-manage-
ment. The Chatham Islands Quota Holdings Limited was incorporated in 1994, where the 
owners of the company are the inhabitants of the Islands.  The main goals of the company are 
buying of the quotas to protect future activities on the Chatham Islands, leasing out of rights 
to the local fishermen, and lobbing the Government to achieve the most favorable regulations.   
Benefits from being in a corporate quota-owner grouping in New Zealand fishery are:  
1. Support from stake-holders, fishermen,  
2. An expertly operated quota-owner group or company,  
3. Extra accountability,  
4. Competence to self-control their “own” rules,  
5. Competence to finance and conduct their own research,  
6. Competence to realize own regulatory regime, for example rotational harvesting,  
7. Competence to negotiate with other consumers of the marine resources, like tourism or 
recreational based,  
8. Closer attention on sustainable management,  
9. Confidence in future business operations with less government intervention, and  
10. Enhanced responsibility for environmental issues, for example activities to decrease 
environmental impacts, improvement of water quality in the regions of the scallop 
fishery, and dumping of liquid and solid effluents at coast.  
 
The Ministry of Fisheries supports the Quota Owner Associations (QOAs) and their improve-
ment in many ways. New Zealand government conceives that QOAs are a minimum expense 
policy tool, which promotes sustainable management and completes current property rights 
approaches in the industry. The benefits for the self-government stakeholder organizations are 
good motivation to reduce costs and to create the best results for shareowners, and direct obli-
gations to the government and to shareowners.   
There are some problems connected to functioning of the system. Not all members 
take part in the decision-making procedure, such a recreational and environmental groups, 
which are not quota-holders and as a result not a part of the company. However, it is im-
portant for the company to consult interest of all groups, in a reverse situation these groups 
may be instrumental in the annual TAC setting exercise implemented by the Ministry of Fish-
eries.   
Sometimes, the company has a narrow view of environmental concerns, because it 
pursued economic objectives. It proved true by the limitation of the shareowner group targets. 
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Challenger is an exception from the rule and this organization is active at all point of environ-
mental protection measures. On the other hand, dredging of scallops is on the record of devas-
tating consequences for the environment, and the question of the process improvement has fi-
nancial limits (Hughey, 2000).  
Hersoug (2002) finished his analysis of co-management with the conclusion that:  
  
“…New Zealand’s experiments with QOAs should be followed closely. Maybe they 
can give some indications to solutions for other nations, where administrative innova-
tions have been conspicuously lacking for years.”  
 
3.6 Offshore and inshore fishing regulations 
 
The number of registered fishing vessels in 2014 was 1 334 vessels, a reduction of 37% since 
1998 (2 126 vessels) (Figure 3).  
 
 
Figure 3. Registered fishing vessels in numbers of fishing vessels in the period 1998-2014 
(Source: OECD Statistics) 
 
The industry in New Zealand consists of two very different sectors. The offshore in-
dustry targets such species as squid, hake, orange roughy, and hoki, and this industry is con-
trolled by a small number of huge vertically integrated processing and harvesting companies. 
The inshore sector targets species such as rock lobster, gurnard, and snapper. The inshore in-
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and independent small-scale fishermen who mainly sell their harvest to the vertically inte-
grated companies. The offshore industry was created only in 1983, when New Zealand intro-
duced the QMS. The government wanted to assist the growing domestic industry to force the 
foreign boats out of 200-mile limit. Between 1988 and 1989, most of the industry experienced 
growth. During that time, the regional fleet was short on offshore capability, so local compa-
nies started to invest heavily in offshore capability and sea farming. The introduction of the 
ITQ in the New Zealand fishing industry gave rise to a fleet development.  
The governmental fishing regulations of the inshore sector has a long history (more 
than 100 years). What is notable, there is a gap in a community-based inshore fishing regula-
tions. But for indigenous Māori people, fishing was an integral piece of the traditional life-
style. The inshore sector had different challenges, the New Zealand’s government realized a 
set of input-based management controls, after (in 1983) they cut out all partial time fishermen 
from commercial fishing (Yandel and Dewees, 2008).   
The inshore fleet (includes  12 and 12-24 m) underwent serious restructuring during 
the introduction of the system that resulted in a change in ownership, boats replacement, 
changed targeting, and new gear set. The sector of the small vessels (  12 m) had a big reduc-
tion of 70% (change in a benefit for larger boats). The 24 – 33 m sector has grown from sev-
eral vessels in the 1970s to a big segment of the offshore fleet. During the introduction of the 
new system, the gains in productivity were found outside the harvesting segment; e.g. cooper-
ation between the offshore and inshore operations, large and new companies, and returns to 
scale in the export and processing segment (Connor, 2001).   
The main factors that led to the acceptance of the ITQ-system in the inshore fishery in 
New Zealand were:   
1. Successful realization of a forerunner to ITQs in the offshore fishery,   
2. A good consultation service that gave a chance for fishermen’ worries and questions to 
be heard,  
3. Support from key members and cooperation between industry and government repre-
sentatives from the beginning of ITQ,   
4. Protection of existing members, including compensations for harvest reductions from 
the government,   
5. A crisis that needed a changeover in current management and lack of any other option 
to meet the crisis,   
6. And tough stance of the Labour Government towards a  reform based on ITQ (Sinner 
and Fenemor, 2005).   
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3.7 Marine biodiversity and aquaculture  
  
Since New Zealand is geographically separated, most of its international trade (above 90% of 
the total volume) relies on seaborne shipping. Many of New Zealand’s species cannot be 
found anywhere else on the planet. This includes marine biodiversity, e.g. about 90% of New 
Zealand’s molluscs are located only in New Zealand. About 120-million-year geographic iso-
lation from other terrestrial parts of the globe makes biodiversity in New Zealand very exclu-
sive.  
About 8,000 marine species have been discovered in New Zealand, including 964 fish 
(where 108 species are unique) 41 marine mammals, 61 seabirds, 2,000 molluscs, 400 echino-
derms, 350 sponges, 700 species of micro-algae and 900 species of seaweeds.  
Between 1965 and 1985, many coastal fish stocks were damaged. After the introduc-
tion of the ITQ system, most of the stocks are at sustainable levels in terms of productivity 
and biomass.  
Since 1978, there has been a ban on hunting of marine mammals (Marine Mammals 
Protection Act). Most of the dolphin, whale, sea lion and fur seal species are reviving. Fisher-
ies by-catch continues to be an issue for some species, like New Zealand sea lion, Hector’s 
dolphin, and albatross. Some marine invertebrates are vulnerable to habitat degradation and to 
overharvesting, due to pollution, transfer of sediments from rivers, and climate changes 
(Hewitt, 2004).  
Aquaculture in New Zealand developed apace, from a hobby to a multimillion-dollar 
industry. It is mostly based on three main species: salmon, oysters and mussels (99% of total 
aquaculture production), and the largest part from it is the endemic GreenshellTM mussel.    
The salmon aquaculture industry was originally introduced to New Zealand as part of 
recreational fisheries. New Zealand is in charge of almost half of the global farmed produc-
tion of Chinook salmon and only Chile is producing sizable quantities of this fish (other than 
New Zealand) (Hersoug, 2002). Exports of aquaculture products amounted to around 300 $ 
million NZ in 2011 (Aquaculture New Zealand, 2011).  
The industry operates worldwide in high seas fisheries for species such as Patagonian 





3.8 Economic efficiency / market  
  
In 2013, the aquaculture and fisheries gave input 896 $ million NZ to gross domestic product 
(0,4% of the national economy) (Statistics New Zealand, 2016). The seafood industry har-
vests around 750,000 tons from aquaculture and fisheries every year. The profit of this catch 
ranges from 1,2 to 1,5 $ billion NZ per year, of which the aquaculture to 200 $ million NZ per 
year. Seafood exports ranks as fourth or fifth biggest export item in the country (OECD, 
2013). In 2015, the TACC for all QMS stocks amounted to 599,126 tons, and the weight of 
actual commercial stocks caught in 2015 was 68% of TACC (409,449 tons).   
The total seafood export value in 2015 was at its highest value since 2000 (see Figure 
4), and amounted to 1,62 $ billion NZ. The main seafood export partners are China, Australia 
and the United States.  
 
 
Figure 4. Total seafood export value in New Zealand, 2000-2015, unit - $ billion NZ, valued 
free on board at New Zealand ports (Sources: Ministry for Primary Industries, Statistics New 
Zealand) 
 
From the total seafood export in 2015 (Figure 5), finfish species amounted to 82% of total 
volume of export (or 236,715 tons) with shellfish about 16% (or 50,690 tons). The main ex-
























































Figure 5. Total seafood export from New Zealand in 2000-2015 in 1000 tons (Sources: Minis-
try for Primary Industries, Statistics New Zealand) 
 
The fishing industry is an important primary industry for New Zealand, contributing at the 
mean over $1,3 billion NZ every year in export incomes to the economy ($1,45 billion NZ in 
2015). In 2013, 47,430 jobs were in New Zealand were in the fishing industry and aquacul-
ture, with a total income before taxes about 657 $ million NZ (Statistics New Zealand, 2016).  
 
3.9 The future of the system 
 
Recently, the government has begun creating Fisheries Plans with clear fisheries management 
objectives. This plan would create close correlation between fisheries management and fisher-
ies research, improve management activities in the industry. Steps that will prevent overfish-
ing in the future are:  
1. Smaller-scale report system to simplify solutions to spatial conflicts;  
2. An electronic monitoring to calculate the amount of discharge of fish in the in-shore 
fisheries;  
3. Strengthening of control of ecosystem subjects, especially requirements for eco-certi-
fication of products;  
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5. Realization of updated national program of action for sharks and seabirds, plan for an 
endangered species (like Maui’s and Hector’s dolphins);  
6. Monitoring of the activities of foreign bottoms fishing in New Zealand waters;  
7. Strengthening of use of ecological risk analysis to advise management actions and re-
search priorities (Mace, 2014).  
 
The Fisheries 2030 Strategy was created by the Hon. Phil Heatley, the Minister of Fisheries in 
2009 (New Zealand Ministry of Fisheries, 2009). The main goal is to maximize New Zealand 
benefits from the utilization of marine resources within environmental limits. How the New 
Zealand fisheries sector might look in 2030 is showed in Figure 6.  
There are two outcome statements to achieve the goal – use outcome and environmen-
tal outcome. For supporting use outcome, the Ministry intends to: increase development and 
research funding; strategy for shared fisheries, create alternative management goals for sus-
tainability of stocks; support actions that allow beneficial use of marine water areas; recon-
sider fisheries law and regulation for the purpose of improving effectiveness and lowering 
compliance costs; and create shared government and industry aquaculture development strat-
egy.  
The actions aimed at supporting environment outcome are: to develop fisheries har-
vest strategy standards; to promote the development of the Resource Management Act4 state-
ments, environmental standards, as well as freshwater and coastal plans, and to develop 
aquatic biosecurity policy to manage risk.   
In improving the governance conditions, the Ministry aims at: strengthening collective 
management actions (include Māori), developing the long-time research plans for improving 
knowledge of the environmental impacts and fish stock, improving communication inside the 
sector and the level of voluntary observation of fisheries laws and standards, discouraging il-
legal activity, and cooperating with Pacific countries to create stable management regimes 
(New Zealand Ministry of Fisheries, 2009).  
 
                                                     
4 The Resource Management Act is the main piece of New Zealand’s legislation that describes how society 
should manage environment. It was signed in 1991. 
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Figure 6. The New Zealand fisheries sector in 2030 (Source: New Zealand Ministry of Fisher-
ies, 2009) 
 
As reported by Hersoug (2002), the QMS are expected to exist for many years ahead, specifi-
cally for two reasons. The first reason is the system has been successful in the context of eco-
nomical and biological indicators. The second one is high investments in the system where a 












For ages, the fish resources constitute the major source of income and employment in coastal 
societies in Norway. When the reconstruction of country began after the Second World War, 
the development of the fishing industry laid the foundation for the development of the coastal 
regions. The Norwegian fishing industry played a great role in the government’s general pol-
icy to keep the settlement system of the coastal societies (Williams and Hammer, 1999).  
Norwegian fisheries management has developed over decades. The structure of the manage-
ment system is complex and includes the setting of TACs and limitations for other fishermen 
on access. (Årland and Bjørndal, 2002).  
Is the Norwegian IVQ system just a stage before a fully implemented ITQ system or is 
it a system in its own right? The answer on this question is still unclear. It is complicated to 
say categorically no, but there are marked differences between the Norwegian vessel quota 
system  and a “pure” ITQ regime. There is no “pure” model in the world, all systems were 
conformed to the local political and historical conditions. The Norwegian IVQ differs from 
the theoretical standard in tenure and transferability of quotas. Assignment of quotas can be 
bought only with a vessel to which they are part of, quota can be moved to another vessel on 
condition that the vessel is permanently taken out from the industry. The elements of classical 
ITQs regime are transferability (center piece) and limitations on transfers. In the same way as 
for ITQs system, transferability of quotas has been created to decrease overcapacity and in-
crease profitability in the fishing fleet. In Norway, quotas have become highly concentrated 
on fewer vessels, that has helped to increase profitability for some fleet segments and achieve 





4.2 History of the system and context 
 
In Norwegian fisheries, appearance of a proper management structure dates from the late 
1960s, the collapse of the Atlanto-Scandian herring stock. Theretofore, there were three basic 
types of the intervention by government in the Norwegian fishery. The first type is the “Re-
gional Fisheries Act” (1897), with “operational rules” to avoid conflicts generated by the ad-
aptation of new harvesting technology and keep order among fishermen.  The second form is 
the “Raw Fish Act” (1938), targeted on controlling the sales of raw fish. The last type of in-
tervention is aimed at limiting of the entry through the use of license into particular fisheries, 
such as the “Trawler Act” (1951), the “Limited Entry Act” (1972), and the “Salt Water Fish-
ing Act” (1955). The last mentioned legislation gave the Ministry of Fisheries a general au-
thority to assume measures fall outside the scope of “operational rules”. These actions varied 
from limitation on the design of gear and size to the setting of TACs for specific stocks (Jen-
toft and McCay, 2007).  
From the end of the Second World War and to the mid-1950s in Norway was a tre-
mendous increase in the landing of herring. After that period of time there was a sharp drop, 
succeeded by a growth again in the 1960s. The Atlanto-Scandian herring stock fallen in the 
late 1960s, a few years after the North Sea stock met a similar fate (Figure 7).  
 
 
Figure 7. Total stock biomass of herring (Norwegian spring spawning) in Norway during 
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The reason of a crisis in a herring catches was a technological breakthrough, such as the con-
struction of asdic and power block used for pulling the purse-seine. These modernizations in-
creased the power of the fleet for a short time and sparked off a collapse of the herring stocks. 
The fishery was frozen in the 1970s to prevent herring stocks from the extinction.  
After the situation in 1970s the “tragedy of the commons” became admitted by everyone in 
the fisheries, and the fisheries biologists came to understand their “watchdog’s” role in the 
avoidance of overexploitation (Lorentzen and Hannesson, 2004).    
The idea of limited entry in Norwegian fisheries was introduced by Klaus Sunnanå, 
the Director of Fisheries, presenting it at the annual meeting of the Norwegian Fishermen’s 
Association in 1967. The argument he proposed was the necessity to adjust the effort and in-
vestment to both markets and stocks, later it became the “Limited Entry Act”. The first 
changes were addressed to the offshore fishery, quotas enforced in the capelin, shrimp, her-
ring and partially in the cod fisheries, but only for trawlers (Jentoft and McCay, 2007).    
A quota-transfer system in Norway was introduced in 1984 in the cod trawler fleet. Also there 
were limitations on the building of new offshore boats until 1985. The main argument has 
been to prevent market oriented transactions of vessels and quotas as means to avoid overca-
pacity and set a stability relative to a varied fleet structure and decentralized control of critical 
cod resources (Standal and Aarset, 2008).   
The crucial moment for the inshore fishery started from 1989 with a dramatic decrease 
of the TAC in the cod. The reason of the “cod-crisis” was a tough competition between in-
shore fishermen for “their” part of the declining general quota. The measures that followed 
after the crisis led to a crisis point in Norwegian fisheries management and broadening of 
management by individual quotas to practically all boats and fisheries. The history of Norwe-
gian fisheries management as well as for New Zealand based on incremental changes and ad-
hoc modifications rather than grand strategies and long-lived planning (Jentoft and McCay, 
2007).    
The lowest level of TAC and “cod-crisis” led to the introduction of the “quota ladder” 
in the early 1990s. The quota ladder defines the relevant shares of the inshore and offshore 
sectors under different TACs (the ladder is showed in Table 2). For example, when the TAC 
is less than 100,000 tons, the offshore fleet will get a smaller share (only 20%) than the in-
shore fleet. Originally, the ladder was created specifically for the cod stocks, but currently it 
includes other stocks as well, the system has been made more complete. The main goal for 
the development of longtime allocation rules has been to find balance and predict future of 
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the industry, especially for fulltime fishermen (Jentoft, 2013). However, the merging of quo-
tas for vessels under the 11 meters has not been allowed yet.  
 
Table 2. Allocation of quota between inshore and offshore sectors. 
Norwegian quota 
(1000 tons) 
Inshore (%) Offshore (%) 
0-100 80 20 
100-150 75 25 
150-200 72 28 
200-300 69 31 
300 and over 65 35 
Source: Directorate of Fisheries 
 
More than 90% of the total catch takes place from shared resources with Russia, the EU, Ice-
land, the Faroe Islands or Greenland. The shared resources create difficulties to be successful 
and prosper in resource management for one country if other participants do not proceed in a 
similar manner. Not only the sharing formula for fish stocks should be mutual, but manage-
ment policy and control measures have to get in line.  
By the Joint Norwegian-Russian Fishing Committee, the total quotas of haddock and 
cod are shared on 50/50 between those two countries. The EU, Iceland, the Faroe Islands, and 
Greenland are allocated 10% of the TAC. In Norway, the TAC quota for haddock and cod is 
split between the trawlers and coastal boats which fish with passive gears like long line, gill 
net, hand line, and Danish seine. The TAC quotas are disposed in line with an allocation key. 
If the Norwegian TAC is less than 100,000 tons, the trawlers get 20%, but the share would 
increase to 35% when the TAC surpasses 300,000 tons (Standal and Aarset, 2008).  
 
4.3 The Core of the system 
 
According to McCay and Jentoft (2007), a system of a ministerial control for the industry is 
possibly characterized as one of “centralized consultation” system. The TACs are based on 
the suggestions from the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (scientific ad-
vice) and according to the bilateral negotiations about shared stocks with other countries 
(“Mixed Norwegian-Russian Fisheries Commission”, for common stocks in the Barents Sea, 
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and the North Sea stocks between Norway and the EU). Before 2002, all the negotiations and 
preparatory documents were under considerable secrecy, even parliament was absent from the 
policymaking procedure. The consultative process at the state level is coming after these ne-
gotiations. The Regulatory Meeting is a consultative committee to the Ministry of Fisheries in 
charge of the Director of Fisheries. The Director makes proposal for the management of dif-
ferent fisheries and stocks and presents it on the meeting. The Director has some decision-
making power over the work of the meeting. The main and final management decisions back-
bone in the Norwegian fisheries in the Ministry that creates the management plan based on 
the advice of the meeting.  
At the sea, when the fish is harvested, the Coast Guard makes inspection of fishing 
boats and verifies their yield against their logbooks. All boats in the Norwegian waters are 
subject to controls. Boats over 24 meters are obliged to have satellite transponders for the 
possibility to monitor their activity all the year.    
 
4.4 Indigenous people (Saami fishing rights) 
 
For a long time, the Sami population has been under pressure of the Norwegian government. 
From the mid 19th century, program towards the minorities in the north of Norway (the Kven 
and the Sami) can be characterized as step-by-step assimilation, or “Norwegianization” (Her-
soug, 2005).  
In 1990, the Sami’s issue was placed on the table for the negotiation in fisheries man-
agement, starting a process for the first time with which we have still to see the end.  
1990 was a year of crisis for the traditional cod fishery, never before the TAC had been fixed 
so low. “Never April 18th again!” The year before, the TAC had been harvested by mid April, 
far from scheduled date (September 1). As a result, the cod fishery was stopped for the rest of 
1989. The fishers with small-scale vessels in the northern fjords suffered badly by this crisis 
because for them the cod fishery season had not even started. The decision of the Fisheries 
Director was the introduction of the vessel quota system in 1990.   
The Norwegian fisheries legislation has an implication that a fisherman is a fisher, no 
matter which ethnic origin he is. Therefore, the Norwegian government was surprised by the 
claim from the newly established Sami Parliament that the quota system disregarded Sami in-
terests and contravened the international law on minorities and indigenous people rights.   
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There was no mentioning in the Norwegian fisheries law about indigenous people rights and 
interests. The Sami Parliament asked for not only marginal corrections in the system, but also 
Sami claimed a full clearing of legal rights in the industry. The government agreed on some 
of the recommendation shortly (according to NOU 2008: 5 Kystfiskeutvalgets for Finnmark).  
For example, the Sami Parliament got a seat in the Fisheries Regulatory Council, but most 
important issues were not clarified (Davis and Jentoft, 2001)  
The story of the Sami is far from being comparable with stories of the success of in-
digenous people in New Zealand or Canada. There is no original treaty, which could be used 
in court to show the rights of the native people for natural resources. The Saami population is 
less than 1% of the Norwegian population, compared to 15% Māori in New Zealand. There-
fore, the political support of the Sami at home is weak (Hersoug, 2005).   
There was a long and complicated process of recognition of Saami rights. Only in 2005, the 
Norwegian Parliament recognized the title to the territory in the north of Norway, Finnmark 
Country, which is a main region of Sami residence (Søreng, 2008)5.  
 
4.5 Self-governance organization  
 
For years, the most important organization in the Norwegian fisheries was the Norwegian 
Fishermen’s Association (Norges Fiskarlag, or NFA), created in 1926. The good position was 
established as a result of being the agent of all industry in the negotiations with government. 
The NFA is an impressive organization regarding the amount of all types of fishermen (own-
ers and crew, small and large, those who use passive or active gear). Also, NFA plays role of 
the parent organization for other more specific associations, like the Norwegian Trawler-
Owners Associations, and the Fishing Vessel Owners Association, which regulates work of 
around 300 of the biggest boat owners in the Norwegian offshore fleet. For years, the authori-
ties needed to keep contact with only one organization, which acted for all fishermen. But this 
organization structure has sparked internal tensions, especially when NFA addressed to re-
source allocation as its principal activity. The entrenched bureaucracy of NFA has realized 
the progressive reduction of fishermen. The Norwegian Coastal Fisher’s Association (NCFA) 
                                                     
5 “Finnmark Act” came into force on 1 July 2006 and consolidated the Sami’s right to be involve in the manage-
ment of Finnmark, the core region for Sami people.  
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was introduced largely because of discontentment with the influence of the bigger boat own-
ers within NFA. NCFA includes generally small-scale range of fishermen mostly from the 
northern part of Norway. It took a long time for NFCA to become recognized by political au-
thorities.  
The Fishermen’s Sales Organizations (FSOs) regulate the economic contacts. The 
FSOs were the cause of great challenges in the 1930s, when fishermen got a legal protection 
for the initiation of fisher-owned sales organization to control the ex-vessel sales of all fish. 
The Raw Fish Act laid the foundation of FSOs. The Norwegian Herring Sales Association 
(all pelagic species) and The Norwegian Raw Fish Association (whitefish) are the two main 
FSOs in Norway. The FSOs control all sales to processors and can set minimum prices, if 
agreement for pieces is not achieved. They also help fisheries authorities in monitoring all 
catches and providing them with statistics.   
The Norwegian Seafood Federation (FHL) is affiliated with the Confederation of Nor-
wegian Business and Industry (NHO). The FHL composes of four offices: FHL aquaculture, 
FHL industry and exports, FHL fish feed and FHL fish meal. The FHL represents the inter-
ests of about 500 member companies. The NHO is the important delegate body for Norwe-
gian employers with more than 20,000 companies starting from small family business to 
transnational companies (Hersoug, 2005).  
The major modification nowadays is that the Raw Fish Act was improved and re-
placed by the new Fish Sales Union Act in 2013. The new act has to reduce influence of the 
sales unions on the prices.  The Act put a mediator into action, in case if the sales unions and 
the fish buyers are not able to come to agreement in the minimum price negotiations. How-
ever, the mediator plays only the role of an adviser (Hersoug, 2015).  
The most important for the development of the Norwegian fisheries is that the organi-
zations traditionally have taken part in policy decisions. However, about half the number of 
all fishermen are disorganized, making problems of freeriding for the companies and prob-
lems of representation for the authorities (Hersoug, 2005).   
 
4.6 Offshore and inshore fishing regulations 
 
The IVQ system consisted of different standardized instruments to control overcapacity in the 
inshore and offshore fleet. A Unit Quota System (UQS) was created to give opportunity for 
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owners of deep-sea trawlers, deep-sea long liners and deep sea purse seiners to move quotas 
from scrapped boats to a new boat.   
Two different systems were established in the inshore fleet – a decommissioning 
scheme and a Structural Quota System (SQS). The SQS was made to control all vessels under 
28 meters. The main rule of the SQS is that 80% of scrapped boat quota may be moved to dif-
ferent boats with the same length group and the same geographical location, and last 20% of 
the quota is divided among the rest of the boats in the same group. However, the boat owners 
from the Finnmark and the northern part of Troms are granted a permission to buy boats with 
quotas from all over Norway which are added to an SQS list.  
There is a special quota portfolio for the structured boat in different length groups. For 
example, owners of the vessels over 15 meters may decide between having a quota portfolio 
of two IVQs in herring fisheries with quotas in the capelin and mackerel fishermen and four 
IVQs in the cod fisheries (haddock, saithe and cod), or four quotas in the herring fisheries and 
two IVQ’s in the cod fisheries (Henriksen, 2014).   
Since 1960, there have been many schemes for the decommissioning of boats. Origi-
nally the purpose was innovation and decrease of the fleet capacity, but now schemes are 
working on a capacity reduction. These arrangements have led to a reduction in total vessel 
numbers as shown in Table 4.   
 
Table 3. Registered powered fishing vessels, by length of vessel and percentage change in 
numbers of fishing vessels in the period 1995-2014. 
Length group 1995 2015 Change 
Vessels under 10 meters 10 872 3 166 -70,9% 
Vessels 10 – 14,99 meters 2 169 2 206 +1,7% 
Vessels 15 – 20,99 meters 591 149 -74,8% 
Vessels 21 – 27,99 meters 183 121 -33,9% 
Vessels 28 meter and over 372 245 -34,1% 
Total 14 187 5 887 -58,5% 
Source: Statistics Norway, Directorate of fisheries 
 
The reason for the quantity reduction in total boats number is disposal of nonworking coastal 
boats from the list and the scrapping program. The main factors for the big reduction in the 
number of smaller coastal boats in the Register of Norwegian Fishing Vessels are the estab-
lishment of an annual fee on boats for being in registration, disposal of non-working boats 
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from the register and removal from operation the small coastal vessels keeping annual per-
mits. The SQS is a reason of the reduction in numbers of the larger coastal vessels and larger 
ocean-going vessels (Directorate of fisheries, 2015).  
 
4.7 Marine biodiversity and aquaculture 
 
Sea regions in Norway are much bigger than its land territory (about six times larger), and in-
clude a huge species diversity. Marine habitats vary from cold waters and fjords in the north 
and used for Arctic species, to warm landlocked regions in the south, which were supported 
oyster farming from olden times. The territory stretches from shallow coastal waters all the 
way to deep-sea areas with a depth of up to 4 000 – 5 000 meters, and from the temperate wa-
ters of the North Sea to the Arctic Oceans. More than 12,000 species have been discovered in 
the Northeast Atlantic. Every year, the special sea bottom-mapping program MAREANO 
registers new species, generally in target regions of northeastern shelf of the Norwegian sea 
and the Barents Sea.  
The Norwegian commercial fisheries are based on a few core species. The central re-
gions for the Norwegian fisheries are the Norwegian Sea, the Barents Sea, the North Sea and 
long coastal line. These regions have simple ecosystems regarding the number of species de-
tected. In spite of the fleet is aimed at more than 70 species, 90% of the yield is covered by 
ten species, seven pelagic and three demersal. The fisheries of the bottom inhabitants of the 
sea are founded on saithe, cod, haddock, with halibut, redfish, turbot, ling, wolf fish, plaice 
and tusk which amounts minor fisheries of economic value. In pelagic fisheries, herring, cap-
elin, mackerel, blue whiting prevail over sprat, sardines and Danish eel catches. In the crusta-
cean shrimp dominates over lobster and crab. The Norwegian fisheries are overly dependent 
on few key species, which cannot be easily substituted for other species (like when larger her-
ring stocks delay the growth of capelin stocks) (Hersoug, 2005). In 2014, fisheries made up 
31% (or 18,7 billion NOK) of total exports.  
 
4.8 Economic efficiency / market 
 
Fisheries play a small role in routine politics in Norway. At the same time, in the coastal re-
gions, the fishery is very significant when it comes to employment and economic effects. On 
the export side, the fish makes the third most important export product for Norway next to oil 
 41 
and gas. Also there are few related industries that were built on Norwegian fishing industry, 
like gear production, ship-building yards, and a huge service sector specializing in everything 
starting from administrative services and to genetic improvement of aquaculture stocks (Her-
soug, 2005). 
In 2015, almost 2.3 million tons of fish, molluscs and shellfish were harvested in Nor-
way, which was about the same level as in the previous year (Figure 8). Cod dominated in 
quantity (almost 18%) and was the most valued species (NOK 5,4 billion) (Norwegian Sea-
food Council, 2015).   
 
Figure 8. Total quantity of catch in Norway, 2000-2015, unit – million tons (Source: Statistics 
Norway) 
 
Norway is a second biggest seafood exporter in the world (after China). In 2015, Norway ex-
ported seafood to 143 countries, 2/3 of which were exported to the EU. In last 10 years, the 
Norwegian seafood exports were more than doubled (NOK 74,5 billion in 2015), 70% of the 
total seafood export belongs to aquaculture (NOK 50 billion in 2015) (Figure 9) (Norwegian 
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Figure 9. Total seafood export value in Norway, 2000-2015, unit - billion NOK (Source: Sta-
tistics Norway) 
 
Salmon and trout combined to 41% of total volume of export (or 1,07 mil tons), with cod 
about 15% (or 0,4 mil tons). In 2014, Norway exported trout and salmon for NOK 46,2 bil-
lion, while the codfish export was worth NOK 12 billion (Figure 10).    
 
 
Figure 10. Total seafood export from Norway, 2000-2015, unit – million tons (Source: Statis-
tics Norway) 
 
The Norwegian fishing industry has always been a main factor to rural development. For the 
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population along the coast. The total number of fishermen in 2015 was 11,146. As before, the 
regions with the highest number of registered fishermen are Finnmark, Troms, Nordland in 
the north of Norway and Møre og Romsdal, Sogn og Fjordane, and Hordaland in the west of 
Norway.  
The reduction in numbers of boats and fishermen has encouraged growth of profitabil-
ity and productivity for present members of the fishery (Table 5, Figure 11). These changes 
have diminished influence of the fishing industry on employment and settlement in coastal 
society. The positive aspects of these reductions were that they happened during a period with 
low unemployment rates and different alternative employment possibilities (Gullestad, 2013).  
 
 
Figure 11. Development of the number of fishermen in the Norwegian fishing industry during 
1945-2015 (Source: Statistics Norway) 
 
The income from the oil industry and the size of the population of Norway (only 5 million) 
made the reduction of the number of fishermen possible and easy. The high petrol tax (78%) to 
the government is largely used to achieve social targets like redistribution of income.  
 
4.9 The future of the system  
  
Currently, the big issue in the Norwegian fishing industry is the Eidessens’ “Committee”. The 
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the future of the quota system. The recommendations would include improvements of the li-
cense system, realization of the resource rent and adaptation of the fleet to the resource base. 
An important argument for a resource rent tax is that only few players now have the rights to 
exploit the common fish resources and value created by the exploitation of the common fish 
resources should be supplied to the Norwegian society. The Commission should as well set a 
time limit for the introduction of the new system. This will ensure that the industry have an 
opportunity to adapt its capacity to the resource base and keep pace with productivity growth 
in the society, so the industry will continue to work as before the changes in the system (Min-
istry of Trade, Industry and Fisheries, 2015).  
The main impacts on the ecosystem towards 2025 are petroleum activity, increase of 
the fisheries, ocean acidification and climate change. The criteria for selecting the regions un-
der the area based management plans were regions with high concentration of stocks and high 
production and a large part of endangered habitats, and when it is a critical area for nationally 
or internationally important populations (Quillfeldt, 2009). The development of the fishing 
industry in Norway looks toward the improvement of productivity and healthy conditions of 









Chapter 5. Discussion 
 
The institutional theory supposes that there is always tales of the past in the present practices 
and regulations. New Zealand does not have a long history of the fishing industry, but it has  
Māori fisheries. As a coastal society, Māori people have been dependent on fish like a prem-
ier source of food6. They were connected to the use of marine resources a long time ago 
(about 800 years ago). In the 18th century, the Māori had different fishing techniques, engi-
neered to catch selected fish stocks, and developed social organization. They collected sea-
food not only for domestic consumption but for barter with distant societies as well. When the 
European colonists arrived, the Māori already had a well-developed fisheries management 
based on property rights. It took less than 150 years for colonists to ruin this system (Her-
soug, 2002).  
Before the declaration of New Zealand’s EEZ (1978), the country was more oriented 
on other primary industries like forestry and farming. “This has probably retarded the rate of 
the development of the industry” (Slack, 1969). The fishing industry was small, and focused 
on a national inshore industry, there was no offshore fishing. When New Zealand imple-
mented the EEZ in 1978, nobody knew about the weight of future fisheries. Suddenly New 
Zealand had one of the biggest EEZs in the world (Hersoug, 2002). Even though New Zea-
land’s QMS is one of the oldest quota systems in the world, the fishing industry on its own is 
relatively new, but since the beginning it has centered around the licenses. Because of it, the 
QMS in New Zealand is almost a pure model of ITQ system. QMS has changed in some 
ways, but the core principles of the ITQ have remained constant (Yandle and Dewees, 2000).  
On the other side, the Norwegian fishing industry that has been traditionally an important part 
of the economy and development in the country, and laid the foundation for the coastal socie-
ties of northern and western Norway. The modern history of the fishing industry in Norway 
started in 1900s, the institutional transformation of the industry begun in the 1930s. In that 
year, seafood amounted to 15% of the total value of Norwegian exports, it was 90% of all 
Norwegian fish products. Even at that moment, when the industry just appeared, a process of 
                                                     
6 For many years, New Zealand’s land did not have large mammals to feed population. Only in 1769, Captain 
Cook brought with him the first mammals (pigs, sheep, and goats) (Hersoug, 2002).  
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organizational and technical change made the system more effective but less flexible. The 
first two sales organizations in the fishing industry were approved by the Norwegian govern-
ment in 1929, those who monopolies have been authorized in the herring fishery. Meanwhile, 
the fishermen started to understand that acting individually in the market would not bring 
good prices on herring (Holm, 1995). To deal with the matter, there was formed The Ministry 
of Fisheries (nowadays the Ministry of Trade and Fisheries) in 1946. In addition, the Norwe-
gian College of Fisheries Science was created in 1972 as part of the University of Tromsø 
(Hersoug, 2005). The long process of establishment of the fishing industry in Norway and 
strong traditions had an impact on the choice of the modern fisheries management. It must be 
mentioned that during all changes, details of the “old” industry has been kept alive. Norway 
rejected the pure ITQ regime, and the main reason for this was a fear of privatization of the 
commons. It was clear that it was needed to have TACs, closed access, and that the exclusive 
right to fish is divided between the restricted number of fishermen, based on tradition. The 
Norwegian government made a decision in favor of the IVQ regime in 1989 on the recom-
mendation of the Advisory Board for Fisheries Regulations7 (OECD, 2011). In comparison 
with a long decision making process in Norway, the ITQ regime in New Zealand offshore 
fishery was established quite fast just after a short discussion with industry. Norway is a par-
liamentary constitutional monarchy. Executive power in Norway is operated by the cabinet, 
led by the Prime Minister, and the King (Harald V, since 17 January 1991) has only nominal 
power. New Zealand’s system of government is parliamentary democracy and the country is 
also a member of the Commonwealth of Nations. Queen Elizabeth II is the chief of New Zea-
land, but “the Queen Elizabeth II reigns, but the government leads”. The countries have multi-
party systems.    
In Norway, fishermen have been a strong political force at all the times. In Norway, the fish-
ermen have for hundred years been a well-organized group. This interrupted any fundamental 
change, since co-management always included consultations with the NFA. Since 1926, the 
organization of fishermen has been an important political factor. The Norwegian fishing in-
dustry played a critical role behind the negotiations of entry into the European Community in 
1972. Still it is a main issue in the debate with regard to joining the EU. Close relations be-
tween industry organizations and the government has not been problematic. The political sys-
tem in Norway has escaped disturbances due to corruption scandals, which indicates the high-
                                                     
7 The Advisory Board for Fisheries Regulations was the main policy arena for discussion the IVQ regime. It was 
created in 1983 as the meeting place between the fisheries leaders and the industry representatives (OECD, 2011).   
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level of political trust and the public acceptance of strong links between fisheries and the 
Norwegian government. There has always been a conflict between the Norwegian Parliament 
and the Sami Parliament regarding the Sami fishing rights.  Though, the “Finnmark Act” is a 
great victory for the Sami people and the official document created the Finnmark property, 
which is the new administration organ that will manage the region, but the fishing rights are 
still not clarified (Søreng, 2007). New Zealand and Norway started significant changes in the 
management of their fisheries industries due to crises. In modern history of the Norwegian 
fishing industry there has been two resources crisis: the crisis in the herring fisheries in the 
late 1960s and the “cod-crisis” in the 1990s. At the time of the fist crisis, the Norwegian fish-
eries accepted “limited entry” as solution (Act on the Regulation and Participation in Fisher-
ies was introduced in 1972). The crisis in the 1990s included on the agenda the issue of over-
capacity, the “cod-crisis” touched mostly the inshore fleet (OECD, 2011). Although, the 
“cod-crisis” was a biological crisis, it was clear that the marine biologists popularized the im-
pression of a great crisis, which led to the creation of a new management system and intro-
duction of limited entry to the industry. In practice, the IVQ had been established already by 
using maximum quotas (Hersoug, 2005).  In New Zealand the crisis happened in the inshore 
fisheries in the 1980s. At that time, the inshore industry was overcrowded and overcapital-
ized. In the early 1980s, sector of economy was created with high level of protection, which 
brought about a lack of competition and inefficiency. At that time, New Zealand’s economy 
was characterized by high level of inflation, low economic growth and the trade was decreas-
ing. Those characteristics moved New Zealand from a highly regulated country to one of the 
most deregulated economy in the west (OECD, 2011).  
In 1984, the Government’s Inshore Fisheries Management Discussion Paper was of-
fering three options for the destroyed inshore industry, and one of them was the introduction 
of the ITQ system. But in the same way as for the Norwegian fisheries, the idea was not a to-
tal breakthrough form 1982, a similar regime had been recommended and partly implemented 
in the offshore fisheries (Hersoug, 2002).  
The initial allocation of quotas in both cases was based on the “historical rights”. In 
New Zealand’s ITQ system, TACs for the commercial fishery were allocated according to 
vessel catch history, the average of the two best years for the period 1981-1984. Quotas were 
allocated between fishermen for free, but the requisitions for initial allocation were very 
strict. (Aranda and Christensen, 2009).   
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Because of the cod-crisis in Norway, the priority was given to the cod fisheries. The 
“historical rights” in the cod catches, which state that the fishermen who had fished cod be-
fore should be favored, later were fixed according to the qualifying period (1987-1989) by the 
Ministry of Fisheries in cooperation with NFA. The quota was allocated to the vessel on the 
basis of the average harvest records inside the size group to which it belonged. Therefore, all 
vessels in one size group would receive the same quota (Hersoug, 2005). Rights were allo-
cated for free.  
According to the Fisheries Act 1996, the general maximum holding limit in New Zea-
land fisheries allowed up to 35%. The fishermen could keep up to 45% of the quota for stocks 
presented in the Fifth Schedule; this meant the high level of needed investments to participate 
in these fisheries. Also there were few species exceptions to the maximum aggregation of the 
quota: maximum 20% of paua quota in a specific QMA, maximum 20% of the total bluenose 
quota, and up to 10% of spiny rock lobster quota in any one QMA (The Fisheries Act, 1996).  
In Norway, the maximum aggregation for each vessel allocated due to quota factors (QFs), 
were based on the fixed shares of the TACs. For example, the small purse seine equipped 
boats may use 1,82 QFs the North Sea and 0,5 QFs in Skagerrak. Maximum quota for boats 
equipped with purse license may use 2,49 QFs in the North Sea and 0,5 QFs in Skagerrak. 
Maximum aggregate quota for boats with pelagic trawl permit may use 0,79 QFs in the North 
Sea (Regulation No. 11 on quota factor when fishing for herring in the North Sea and Skager-
rak in 2015). Also, in Norway, the allocation of TAC between inshore and offshore fleet is 
based on the “quota-ladder” (the ladder illustrated in Table 3).  
In New Zealand, rights are held in perpetuity. In Norway, rights have time limitations, 
which is 20 years’ duration on structural quotas for the offshore and inshore fleets, if it was 
reintroduced and for 25 years’ duration, if it would have been already allocated (OECD, 
2013). In relation to who can own quotas, ITQ holders in New Zealand must be citizens, resi-
dents or companies characterized as New Zealand companies (at least 75% of New Zealand 
ownership) (Shotton, 2000). The foreign controlled organizations may not be holders of fish 
quotas in New Zealand. Right to acquire a fishing vessel in Norway can be given to Norwe-
gian citizens or joint-stock companies located in Norway (60% of Norwegian ownership), 
where all members of the board are shareowners and Norwegian citizens with residence in 
Norway.  
Figure 12 summarizes the main characteristics and the effects of New Zealand ITQ 




Figure 12. Characteristics of the New Zealand ITQ system and the Norwegian IVQ system 
(Sources: OECD, 2006, Gallic, 2004) 
  
As with ITQs, IVQs give holders of the right with a high level of exclusivity (ranked 5 out of 
5 on the scale). The holder knows that the others would not damage his quota by exceeding of 
their own quotas. The right holder knows what his production will be independently of the 
others.   
The quality of title (or security) in New Zealand ITQs regime is on the same high level 
as with Norwegian IVQs (ranked 5 out of 5 on the scale). The right to access the resource in 
Norway and New Zealand is secure.   
The choice on how to harvest the quota is almost flexible in Norway and New Zea-
land. The flexibility of the right may be admitted as high but limited (ranked 4 out of 5 on the 
scale).   In Norway, IVQs are allocated every year, that explains the duration like limited and 
low value characteristics (ranked 2 out of 5 on the scale). The difference between New Zea-
land´s ITQs and Norwegian IVQs is that ITQs can be allocated on a permanent basis. The 
level of the duration in ITQs is high (ranked 5 out of 5 on the scale).  
Transferability is a key characteristic in the New Zealand system. Though, full trans-
ferability is not necessary, New Zealand keep foreign agents out of the industry (ranked 4 out 
of 5 on the scale) (OECD, 2006). The pure model of the individual vessel quotas is not trans-
ferable (ranked 0 out of 5 on the scale). Although, in Norway, the variant systems of the tradi-
tional IVQ system allow some forms of long-term transferability. The UQS for deep-water 















of 5 on the scale). The SQS for coastal boats (15-28 m) permits the owner of two boats to 
move quota from one boat to another subject to one boat is scrapped (ranked 2 out of 5 on the 
scale). And the Quota Exchange System (QES) for coastal boats less than 28 m allows coop-
eration of two boat owners inside one group for fishing both quotas on one boat for three out 
of five years (ranked 3 out of 5 on the scale) (Gallic, 2004). The average level of the transfer-
ability for the Norwegian quota is ranked 3 out of 5 on the scale.  
New Zealand ITQs can be easily aggregated or divided, any share may be moved. The 
level of  divisibility is high (ranked 5 out of 5 on the scale). Because the connection between 
the divisibility and transferability is high, in case with the pure IVQ regimes it becomes diffi-
cult to divide quota (ranked 0 out of 5 on the scale). Due to the modified systems of the tradi-
tional IVQ regime (UQS, SQS and QES), the level of the divisibility is relatively high, but 
limited (ranked 4 out of 5 on the scale).  
Compared to Norwegian IVQs, ITQs in New Zealand are described by higher level for 
all key factors. That means the ITQs can permit both the long-term investment and short-run 
utilization of fish capacity. However, the development of innovative variants of IVQs in Nor-
way offers additional flexibility to the regime (OECD, 2006).  
The Harvest Strategy Standard that complies with the Fisheries Act 1996, indicates 
four measures which used to classify the status of fisheries and stocks in New Zealand. The 
first one is the “soft limit”, the stock is almost depleted or overfished and needs to be inten-
sively rebuilt. The next is the “hard limit”, it describes that the stock is close to be collapsed 
and fishing should be cautious with a view to fix the stock as fast as that possible. The third 
measure is the “overfishing threshold”, this limit should not be surpassed, as it will lead to the 
depletion of the stock biomass below biomass limits and/or management targets (if this has 
not happened yet). The last one is the “management target” which is illustrative of the bio-
mass level, but sometimes given as a fishing mortality standard.  
By the end of 2015, the biggest part of the fisheries in New Zealand performed well. 
According to the Status of New Zealand’s Fisheries by the end of 2015, regarding the number 
of fish stock of known status: 82,8% of fish species exceeded their “soft limits”, 94,0% ex-
ceeded the “hard limit”, 85,1% of fish stocks were below the “overfishing threshold”, and 
72,5% of stocks exceeded the “management target”. Regarding the volume of landings of 
species of known status: 96,8% of stocks above their “soft limits”, 99,6% exceeded the “hard 
limit”, 94,6% of the landings was below the “overfishing threshold”, and 93,5% exceeded the 
“management targets”.  The key conclusion from these numbers is that almost all of the New 
Zealand’s fisheries are effective (Ministry for Primary Industries, 2016).  
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According the report of the Northern Research Institute (2016), in Norwegian fisher-
ies, the traditionally harvested stocks are almost fully exploited, but the aquaculture sector 
has possibility to quintuple their production. Because the biggest part of the wild stocks bio-
mass harvested from species shared with other countries (Russia, Iceland, EU, the Faroes Is-
lands, Greenland), the biomass accessible for Norwegian fisheries is varied according to the 
stock size, the stock size of species that are not shared, and the volume of the TAC allocated 
Norwegian vessels. So, the condition of the Norwegian stocks is determined from the interna-
tional negotiations and biological factors. In Norwegian fisheries, the utilization of the tradi-
tional fish species is mostly well balanced with the unstable resource base. The future alterna-
tive for increase of the fisheries is through use of other fish and marine species, like seaweed 
and plankton (Falk-Anderson, Forbord and Vennesland, 2016).   
The economic sustainability of the Norwegian seafood industry can be determined by 
profit. Based on data from Statistics Norway, the contribution the fishing industry and aqua-
culture was NOK 63,8 billion, up to 8% from 2014 (NOK 58,3 billion) (Figure 13). In Nor-
way, the increase of the economical sustainability is noticed.  
 
Figure 13. Total growth in the seafood sector, unit – billion NOK (Source: Statistics Norway) 
 
According to the Statistics Norway, the annual growth in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is 
1,9% (in 2012), the seafood sector grew by 5,5% per year, and the others of the industrial sector 





























Figure 14. Total Norwegian growth in value generation, in the fisheries/aquaculture sector 
and the industrial sector in general, 1970-2008 (Source: Reve and Sasson, 2012) 
 
The economic effects of the seafood industry in New Zealand can be measured regarding the 




Figure 15. Total growth in the seafood sector, unit - $ million NZ (Source: OECD, 2015) 
 
In 2013, the seafood industry in New Zealand contributed 896 $ million NZ to GDP, which 

























Figure 16. The value creation (contribution to GDP) and proportion of the marine economy, 
2007-2013 (Source: Statistics New Zealand) 
 
The fisheries policy in New Zealand plays an important role regarding the Māori, who have 
established rights to the fishery. The Māori rights have been fundamental for their traditions, 
doctrine of land title, and the Treaty. On the other side, the Sami fishing rights, include rights 
as part of their traditions, international agreements, and local legislation. The Lapp Codicil, 
article 12 (1751)8 can be defined this way, but the codicil does not give the same rights as the 
Treaty. As opposed to Norway, New Zealand has a common law structure with an unwritten 
constitution. In the case of the Sami people, the development of legal precedent and legisla-
tion in New Zealand relative to Māori rights could make a foundation for the recognition of 
the Sami fishing rights (Toki, 2010).    
Today, the difference between observance of Māori fishing rights in New Zealand and 
Sami fishing rights in Norway is large. For example, now Māori control over one-third of the 
commercial fisheries in New Zealand and Sami have just an extra Sami quota on cod in the 
north of Norway (an extra 3,000 tons).  
                                                     
8 The Lapp Codicil from 1751 is an agreement that established the Norwegian-Swedish border. This codicil for-
malized the rights of the Saami (or the Lapps) to prosecute with their historic migratory reindeer on the newly 







Chapter 6. Conclusions 
 
The Norwegian IVQ system combines aspects of both strong public governance and market 
mechanism. The IVQ system was created to specifically avoid market transactions of related 
vessels and quotas, to provide diversity of the fleet structure, and to decentralized ownership 
of cod quotas in business ineffective regions (the “cod-crisis” in the 1990s). For that reasons, 
the ITQ system with a strong concentration of quotas and full transferability has never been a 
right alternative. However, time moves along and the original IVQ has been forced to move 
from a nonflexible system, towards a market-oriented regime to increase transferability of the 
vessels and quotas. During the “cod-crisis”, the ITQ system was rejected to avoid concentra-
tion of the cod quotas on the “privileged few”, but the opposition didn’t take the potential for 
changes in ownership and vessel’s weak economy into account. As a result, the big corporate 
investors took over the “lion’s share” of the trawler fleet in the north of Norway (Standal and 
Aarset, 2007).  
The ITQ market in New Zealand is a highly segmented, divided into different geo-
graphical regions, that gives a large number of segmented quota markets. The ITQ system 
does not provide a full transferability; the selling and buying of quotas go on without re-
strictions. Compared to the New Zealand model, the IVQ system has the limitations based on 
transferability because of governmental approval (Hersoug, 2005).  
Biological and economic factors of the Norwegian IVQ system and the New Zealand 
ITQ system are both on a good level. Norway is better in economic sustainability due to the 
size and the importance of the industry. On the other hand, the stock biomass in New Zealand 
is not under the outside pressure. Because of the co-operation between Norway, Russia, Ice-
land, Greenland, the EU and the Faro Islands, scientists are worried about the condition of 
many stocks. Countries cannot agree on lower catches, especially in the pelagic fisheries and 
today the total catch is exceeded by far the recommended annual tonnage according to scien-
tists.  
From an ethnical point of view, the Norwegian government has encroached on the 
Sami people´s legitimate rights for a long time. The point of view of the Norwegian authori-
ties is that traditional use is not an appropriate basis to constitute a right. It may happen, that 
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in the future, the Norway will accept the consultation process with the Sami people to admin-
istrate and distribute their assets, in the similar way as the process undertaken by Māori peo-
ple in New Zealand.  
Over the time the Norwegian government have acknowledged that the ITQ system is 
an effective instrument to reduce overcapacity. The limitations on quota trade have gradually 
been reduced.   
The quota has been distributed to more and more vessel groups. The IVQ system is 
still subject to continuous development, but even though there are still vessels outside the sys-
tem, the core of the system is under transferable quotas now (around 75-80% of landings) 
(Hannesson, 2012). The IVQ system unavoidably leads to the same fleet structure and con-
centration of quotas as the experience from the New Zealand’s ITQ system. The IVQ model 
was originally created to decentralize the distribution of the vessels and quotas and make 
small companies stronger. However, today the IVQ system in Norway seems to be best suited 
for the strongest stakeholders and not for the weak and small actors in rural fisheries depend-
ent regions (Standal and Aarset, 2007).  
The Norwegian fishing industry is a complex structure with the long history. The de-
velopment of the IVQ system makes it similar to the ITQ system. But as for now it is compli-
cated to predict the future of the fisheries management and the way it would look in a few 
decades. No matter what would happen, the Norwegian “final” product will always be 
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